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When Ali Khamenei was nominated by senior clerics to replace Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as Iran’s supreme leader in 1989, he insisted he was underqualified.
1989年，当高级教士提名阿里·哈梅内伊（Ali Khamenei）接替阿亚图拉鲁霍拉·霍梅尼（Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini）出任伊朗最高领袖时，他坚持认为自己资历不足。
Khamenei, who has died at the age of 86 after joint US-Israeli air strikes on Saturday, told the clerics of the Assembly of Experts that one had “to really weep for Islamic society” that he was even considered.
哈梅内伊于周六在美以联合空袭中去世，享年86岁。他曾对专家会议（Assembly of Experts）的神职人员表示，竟然会考虑选择他，“真该为伊斯兰社会痛哭”。
Yet Khamenei went on to become one of the longest-reigning leaders in Iran’s modern history, his initial modesty later replaced by a reluctance to relinquish power and a reliance on hardliners to maintain it.
然而，哈梅内伊后来成为伊朗近代史上在位时间最长的领导人之一；他起初的谦逊渐被不愿放权所取代，并依靠强硬派维系其统治。
A defining feature of his 37 years in charge was an Iranian foreign policy built on hostility towards the US and Israel, which reached such intensity that one reformist politician described it as “the core identity” of the regime.
他主政的37年间，一个鲜明特征是伊朗的外交政策以对美国和以色列的敌意为基调，这种敌意之强烈，甚至令一位改革派政治家称其为该政权的“核心身份”。
His view of “the enemy” was partly shaped during the war between Iraq, which was backed by the west and the Gulf states, and Iran in the 1980s, during which he appeared in military uniform on the front lines. Once he took power in Tehran, he nurtured regional proxies, strengthening militant groups, exploiting conflicts and destabilising the region in an attempt to deter foreign aggression against Iran. He publicly boasted of financial and military support to Lebanese, Syrian, Palestinian, Iraqi and Yemeni militias.
他对“敌人”的看法，部分形成于上世纪80年代伊拉克（获西方和海湾国家支持）与伊朗的战争期间；其间他曾身着军装出现在前线。此后在德黑兰掌权后，他培植地区代理人，壮大武装组织，借机利用冲突、扰乱地区稳定，意在威慑针对伊朗的外来侵略。他还公开吹嘘向黎巴嫩、叙利亚、巴勒斯坦、伊拉克和也门的民兵提供资金与军事支持。
As he pursued his hardline policies, international concerns grew over Iran’s nuclear programme and the risk that the country would develop nuclear weapons together with its ballistic missiles. Khamenei showed “heroic flexibility” — in his own words — by agreeing to Iran’s 2015 nuclear accord with major powers, trading near-total closure of the “peaceful” programme for sanctions relief.
在他推行强硬政策之际，国际社会对伊朗的核计划日益担忧，认为该国存在与其弹道导弹一并发展核武器的风险。哈梅内伊用他自己的话说，展现了“英勇的灵活性”，同意伊朗在2015年与主要大国达成核协议，以对这一“和平”项目的近乎全面封存换取制裁缓解。
When US President Donald Trump in 2018 withdrew Washington from the deal despite Iran’s compliance, citing Tehran’s funding of “terrorism”, Khamenei saw confirmation of his long-held belief that the US was untrustworthy. “The US’s problem is not about the nuclear programme, or missiles,” he said at the time. “Rather, they want to undermine our power base.”
2018年，美国总统唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）以尽管伊朗遵守协议、但德黑兰资助“恐怖主义”为由，让华盛顿退出了这项协议，哈梅内伊据此认为，他长期以来对美国“不可信任”的看法得到了印证。当时他表示：“美国的问题不在于核计划或导弹，而是他们想要削弱我们的权力基础。”
New US sanctions followed, weighing heavily on the lives of Iranians by depriving the country of petrodollars and access to the international financial system.
随后，美国出台新一轮制裁，剥夺伊朗的石油美元收入与进入国际金融体系的渠道，沉重压迫伊朗人的生活。
Khamenei mostly blamed Iran’s presidents — elected every four years — for the country’s economic failures, arguing that more should be done to foster self-reliance, even though he was the ultimate decision maker on all key policies. One of his relatives said: “He was always against an influx of foreign investment into the country, for fear of foreign influence.”
哈梅内伊主要将伊朗的经济失败归咎于每四年选举一次的总统们，主张应更多推动自力更生，尽管所有关键政策的最终决策权在他手中。他的一位亲属说：“他始终反对外国投资大量流入国内，担心引入外国影响。”
Another relative said: “He told me, ‘I don’t want Iran to become another Malaysia. I just want a model in which not a single Iranian goes hungry.’”
另一位亲属说：“他告诉我，‘我不希望伊朗变成另一个马来西亚。我只想要一种模式，让没有一个伊朗人挨饿。’”
But low growth and high inflation, along with political and social repression, fuelled dissent and pushed many below the poverty line. At the time of his death, at least a third of the country’s 90mn people were living in poverty, officials acknowledged.
但低增长和高通胀，再加上政治与社会压制，激化了不满情绪，并使许多人跌入贫困线以下。官员承认，在他去世时，全国约9000万人口中至少三分之一生活在贫困之中。
His rule created a chasm between the regime and the public, and he increasingly came to embody an ageing theocracy seen as out of touch with reality, stubborn and resistant to meaningful change. As a result, protests grew more frequent and more violent, with Khamenei himself becoming the central target.
他的统治在政权与民众之间撕开了鸿沟；他也日益被视为一个与现实脱节、顽固不化、拒绝进行有意义改革的老迈神权统治的化身。结果，抗议愈发频仍且更趋暴力，哈梅内伊本人也成为矛头所向的核心目标。
Anti-regime protests in 2009, 2017, 2019, 2022 and 2026 claimed thousands of lives and featured chants of “Death to Khamenei”, with each round of unrest further undermining the legitimacy of his rule.
2009年、2017年、2019年、2022年和2026年的反政权抗议造成数千人丧生，示威者高喊“打倒哈梅内伊”，每一轮动荡都进一步削弱了其统治的合法性。
In early 2026, in an attempt to justify Iran’s deadliest crackdown when security forces killed thousands of demonstrators, he recalled the country’s history, saying that hundreds of thousands of “the most noble men” had lost their lives to ensure the regime’s survival.
在2026年初，为了为伊朗最致命的一次镇压辩护——当时安全部队杀害了数千名示威者——他回溯该国历史称，为确保政权存续，“最高贵的男子汉”中有数十万人付出了生命。
Yet since the early 2020s, a nation that saw itself as an important Middle Eastern power under Khamenei’s stewardship had gradually been losing its regional clout as tensions with the US intensified.
然而，自2020年代初以来，随着与美国的紧张关系加剧，在哈梅内伊治下自视为中东重要强国的这个国家的地区影响力正逐步流失。
After the attack on Israel by Hamas on October 7 2023 triggered an upsurge in regional conflict, Israel struck back not only in Gaza but also against Iran and its regional surrogates, killing protégés such as Hassan Nasrallah, leader of Hizbollah in Lebanon, whom Khamenei regarded as a son.
在2023年10月7日哈马斯（Hamas）袭击以色列并引发地区冲突升级后，以色列不仅在加沙发动反击，也对伊朗及其地区代理人动手，击杀了哈梅内伊视如己子的门生——黎巴嫩真主党（Hizbollah）领导人哈桑·纳斯鲁拉（Hassan Nasrallah）等人。
Khamenei nevertheless refused to change Iran’s core policy of hostility to the west and Israel: a country that had begged others for missiles to fight Iraq in the 1980s now produced its own long-range missiles, some of which hit Israel after Israel attacked Iran in June 2025.
尽管如此，哈梅内伊仍拒绝改变伊朗对西方和以色列的根本敌对政策：这个在20世纪80年代为对抗伊拉克而向他国乞求导弹的国家，如今已能自行生产远程导弹；在2025年6月以色列袭击伊朗之后，其中一些导弹击中了以色列。
Survival of the Islamic Republic remained his overriding priority. In a move that set him apart from his predecessor, he elevated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps into the country’s most powerful institution — militarily, politically and economically. That weakened traditional pillars of Iranian society, such as the clergy and the business community embodied in the bazaar, which had helped Khomeini secure victory over the shah in 1979.
维持伊斯兰共和国（Islamic Republic）的存续始终是他的首要任务。与其前任不同的是，他将伊斯兰革命卫队（Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps）提升为全国在军事、政治和经济上最具权势的机构。这削弱了伊朗社会的传统支柱，如教士阶层和以集市为代表的商业群体——正是这些力量曾在1979年帮助霍梅尼击败国王。
When he died, his principal loyal force was the Guards, while many social and political factions had become alienated and the economy lay shattered, despite the country having spent hundreds of billions of dollars on his signature policies.
他去世时，他的主要忠诚力量是伊斯兰革命卫队，而许多社会和政治派别已与之离心离德，经济也一片凋敝，尽管国家为他的标志性政策投入了数千亿美元。
One western diplomat said Khamenei presided over a political system that was about trading rather than investment. “They traded away the country’s wealth,” the diplomat said.
一位西方外交官表示，哈梅内伊主持的政治体制更注重交易而非投资。该外交官称：“他们把国家的财富都交易掉了。”
Ali Khamenei was born in the holy city of Mashhad, northeastern Iran, on April 19, 1939.
阿里·哈梅内伊于1939年4月19日出生在伊朗东北部的圣城马什哈德。
He was raised in a respected but poor clerical family. He said they lived a “simple” life in a working-class neighbourhood, sharing one room and a damp basement, and endured nights when “there was no supper”.
他出身于一个受人尊敬却贫困的神职人员家庭。他说，他们在工人阶级社区过着“简单”的生活，挤在一间房和一个潮湿的地下室里，有时晚上“没有晚饭”可吃。
At 19, he entered the Qom seminary, studying under senior clerics, including Khomeini. At 25, he returned to Mashhad and began holding gatherings where he cited the Koran to justify political Islam. His anti-shah and pro-Khomeini speeches led to at least nine periods of imprisonment and internal exile in deprived areas. There, he sought to help the poor and victims of natural disasters by collecting donations.
19岁时，他进入库姆神学院，师从多位高级宗教领袖，其中包括霍梅尼。25岁时，他回到马什哈德，开始举办聚会，援引《古兰经》为政治伊斯兰辩护。他的反国王、亲霍梅尼的演讲，至少导致九次入狱并被流放到贫困地区。在那里，他通过募捐救助穷人和自然灾害受害者。
Khamenei slowly gained a reputation as an avant-garde cleric, breaking taboos by developing interests in music and modern Persian poetry, driving a Volkswagen and smoking a pipe.
哈梅内伊逐渐以一名先锋派教士的形象为人所知：他打破禁忌，迷上音乐和现代波斯诗，开着大众汽车，叼着烟斗。
Until his death, he retained a keen interest in arts and culture, according to the second relative. He read foreign and Iranian novels and historical works, and watched international films. His intellect earned respect even from opponents, who acknowledged he was cultured, knowledgeable and well-read. Critics, however, lamented his rigidity when he refused to allow other Iranians to make their own cultural choices.
据第二位亲属称，直至去世，他始终对艺术和文化保持浓厚兴趣。他阅读国外与伊朗的小说和历史著作，并观看国际影片。他的才智甚至赢得了反对者的尊重，后者也承认他有修养、博学且博览群书。然而，批评者则对他的僵化表示遗憾，尤其是在他不允许其他伊朗人自行作出文化选择时。
“Before the revolution, Khamenei was known in Mashhad as a revolutionary with a modern tendency towards religious intellectualism,” said Mohammad Ali Abtahi, a cleric from the same city and a former vice-president. “After the revolution, however, he sided with the more conservative, traditional forces and distanced himself from moderate figures.”
“在革命之前，哈梅内伊在马什哈德被视为一位带有现代倾向、走向宗教知识分子的革命者，”同城出身、曾任副总统的教士穆罕默德·阿里·阿卜塔希（Mohammad Ali Abtahi）说。“然而，革命之后，他站到了更保守、传统的力量一边，并与温和派人物保持了距离。”
Some outsiders saw him as even more politically rigid than his predecessor Khomeini. One western diplomat in Tehran said that whereas Khomeini famously conceded the need to drink from the “chalice of poison” when Iran signed a ceasefire to end the 1980s Gulf war with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, there was no evidence of Khamenei adopting any other aim than outright “victory” during his leadership.
一些外界人士认为，他在政治立场上比其前任霍梅尼更为僵硬。一位驻德黑兰的西方外交官表示，霍梅尼在伊朗与萨达姆·侯赛因（Saddam Hussein）的伊拉克签署停火协议、结束上世纪80年代海湾战争时，曾著名地承认不得不“饮下毒酒之杯”；而没有任何证据显示，哈梅内伊在其领导期间追求过“胜利”之外的其他目标。
Khamenei promoted an “Islamic lifestyle”, advocating early marriage, larger families and mandatory covering for women. But under pressure following the Woman, Life, Freedom movement in 2022, he did not stop President Masoud Pezeshkian from refusing to enforce compulsory hijab in the streets.
哈梅内伊提倡“伊斯兰式生活方式”，主张早婚、多子女，以及女性必须遮盖。但在2022年“女人、生命、自由”运动（Woman, Life, Freedom movement）后压力之下，他并未阻止总统马苏德·佩泽希齐扬（Masoud Pezeshkian）拒绝在街头强制执行头巾令。
When Khamenei moved to Tehran shortly before the 1979 revolution, he was overshadowed by other clerics, such as Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, another former president and pillar of the revolution.
在1979年革命前不久哈梅内伊迁往德黑兰时，他的风头被其他神职人员所盖过，例如阿克巴尔·哈什米·拉夫桑贾尼（Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani）——另一位前总统、这场革命的支柱。
A gifted orator and shrewd politician, Khamenei won the trust of Khomeini, who described him as “among unique figures who are like the sun, radiating light”.
作为一位才华横溢的演说家和精明的政治家，哈梅内伊赢得了霍梅尼的信任，后者称他是“如日之人，光芒四射的独特人物之一”。
After serving as deputy defence minister, acting head of the revolutionary guards and a member of parliament, he was elected president in 1981 — barely three months after surviving an assassination attempt by the opposition Mujahedin-e Khalq that paralysed his right hand.
他先后出任副国防部长、革命卫队代理负责人及议会议员，并于1981年当选总统——就在此前不到三个月，他曾遭反对派人民圣战者组织（Mujahedin-e Khalq）的暗杀企图而幸存，但右手因此瘫痪。
His first major test as supreme leader came in 1997, when Mohammad Khatami, a reformist cleric, won the presidency, promising political reform and improved foreign relations.
他作为最高领袖的首次重大考验出现在1997年：改革派神职人员穆罕默德·哈塔米（Mohammad Khatami）赢得总统大选，承诺推进政治改革并改善对外关系。
Tensions between Khatami, who served until 2005, and Khamenei as the supreme leader fuelled fierce infighting within the regime. The hardliners won, and a crackdown on reformists followed, including bans on running for national office.
曾任总统至2005年的哈塔米与最高领袖哈梅内伊之间的紧张关系，激化了政权内部的激烈内斗。强硬派最终胜出，随后对改革派展开镇压，包括禁止其竞选全国公职。
The hardliners then backed Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad, but the move backfired for Khamenei when Ahmadi-Nejad turned against the supreme leader and demanded greater authority. Ahmadi-Nejad was followed by Hassan Rouhani, a centrist who pursued the nuclear accord and sought closer ties with the US, which only deepened the rivalries within the Iranian elite.
随后，强硬派改而支持马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪-内贾德（Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad），但当他转而反对最高领袖哈梅内伊并要求更大权力时，此举对哈梅内伊适得其反。其后由中间派的哈桑·鲁哈尼（Hassan Rouhani）接任，他推动达成核协议并寻求与美国建立更紧密的关系，却进一步加深了伊朗精英内部的对立。
Ebrahim Raisi, a hardline president seen as a likely successor to Khamenei, died in a helicopter crash in 2024 under unclear circumstances. Pezeshkian, a reformist, was the last president to serve under Khamenei.
被视为哈梅内伊的可能接班人的强硬派总统易卜拉欣·莱希（Ebrahim Raisi）于2024年在不明情况下因直升机坠毁身亡。改革派的佩泽希齐扬是哈梅内伊任内最后一任总统。
Khamenei never publicly addressed the matter of his succession and groomed no clear heir. Instead, his regime simply sidelined opponents. It is not clear whether the revolutionary guards on whom he depended will seek to preserve his legacy or follow another path.
哈梅内伊从未公开谈及继任问题，也未培植明确的接班人。相反，他的政权只是将反对者排挤在外。目前尚不清楚，他所倚重的革命卫队会努力维护其政治遗产，还是走上另一条道路。
Khamenei is survived by his wife, four clerical sons, two daughters and at least a dozen grandchildren.
哈梅内伊的在世直系亲属包括其妻子、四个神职人员儿子、两个女儿，以及至少十几位孙辈。