EU’s oil ban: if market friction is low, so is the pain for Russia - FT中文网
登录×
电子邮件/用户名
密码
记住我
请输入邮箱和密码进行绑定操作:
请输入手机号码,通过短信验证(目前仅支持中国大陆地区的手机号):
请您阅读我们的用户注册协议隐私权保护政策,点击下方按钮即视为您接受。
FT商学院

EU’s oil ban: if market friction is low, so is the pain for Russia

The bloc’s agreed partial embargo may prove to be ineffective as higher prices could compensate for reduced volumes

The aim of economic warfare is to inflict maximum pain at minimum cost. Achieving that is hard when the target is a key commodity producer. The EU’s agreement to ban most Russian oil imports reflects justified outrage at the barbaric invasion of Ukraine. But it may prove to be ineffective.

The problem with oil is that it is traded internationally. Higher prices may compensate Russia for reduced volumes, as US Treasury secretary Janet Yellen argued in April. Equally, customers in the EU and outside it may swap sources of supply in response to price signals, with little ultimate impact on the Russian exchequer.

The lower the level of substitution, the more powerful the partial embargo. Some countries, for example, lack refineries that can process Urals, Russia’s sulphurous main export blend.

That is not a problem for China and India. They have already moved to fill the gap in demand for Russian oil created by self-sanctioning by European refiners and traders. India rarely bought Russian oil in the past. But it emerged as the largest purchaser of Russian Urals crude in April, according to S&P Global.

Asian countries may not take up the full slack in demand for Russian oil, however, fearing retaliatory western sanctions. Capital Economics thinks Russia’s oil exports will fall by a fifth this year, even allowing for a 15 per cent rise in exports to non-western countries. But after factoring in higher prices, the consultancy estimates that Russia’s oil export revenues will be $180bn, a mere $2bn lower than in 2021.

The gap between Brent and Urals crude — currently $31 — may eventually fall in response to substitution. One response from the west may be to ban its insurers from covering tankers carrying Russian oil. Creating friction of a logistical kind is one way of compensating for a lack of it in markets.

Even after the oil embargo is fully phased in next year, it may be more than offset by higher gas prices. The oil embargo reduces Europe’s financial complicity. It will not, by itself, sabotage the Russian war machine.

版权声明:本文版权归FT中文网所有,未经允许任何单位或个人不得转载,复制或以任何其他方式使用本文全部或部分,侵权必究。

特朗普的阿拉斯加州液化天然气项目未能打动亚洲盟友

日本和韩国抵制美国压力,拒绝将对管道项目的承诺纳入贸易协议。

FT社评:Meta高薪争夺AI人才暗藏隐忧

无论是足球还是股票分析,明星太多都让团队运作变得困难。

乌克兰无人机袭击致索契俄罗斯油库起火

弗拉基米尔•泽连斯基对黑海设施遭远程打击表示欢迎,目前无人机和导弹的交火仍在持续。

我们不能把全球贸易的所有混乱都归咎于特朗普

世界贸易组织的许多体制和程序已经失灵,我们应当承认这一失败。

欧佩克+将石油产量配额上调至两年来最高水平

分析师预测,在该卡特尔取消减产后,原油将在今年年底前出现供应过剩。

中国出口会继续无视特朗普的贸易战吗?

我们可以预期英格兰银行利率制定者会释放哪些信号?美股还能继续上涨吗?
设置字号×
最小
较小
默认
较大
最大
分享×